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Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Economic 
PERSPECTIVE 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
SCOTTISH SKI CENTRES ON THE 
HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS 
ENTERPRISE REGION 
by Nicola Milne, Alan Radford and Geoff 
Riddington, Department of Economics, 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent polarised arguments between 
conservationists and the pro-skiing lobby over 
the proposed Cairngorm Funicular railway 
have raised amongst other issues the 'value for 
money' of public investment in the Scottish 
skiing industry. This paper considers the 
economic impact of Scottish ski centres, to the 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise (H.I.E) area. 
The justification for and estimated contribution 
of public investment in the Scottish skiing 
industry is outlined in the second section. The 
economic impact of Scottish ski centres on the 
H.I.E economy is outlined in section three. 
The final fourth section draws some tentative 
conclusions about the prudence of public 
sector funding of the Scottish skiing industry. 
2. PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN THE 
SCOTTISH SKHNG INDUSTRY 
Downhill skiing has a long history in Scotland 
with skiers noted on the Scottish hills as early 
as the 1890s (Simpson, 1982). Organised 
skiing with uplift provided by caterpillar 
tracked vehicles and mechanised tows began 
in 1907 with the founding in that year of the 
Scottish Ski Club (Elliot et al, 1988). In the 
1930s the first ski hut was erected on Ben 
Lawers (Davidson, 1981). In the 1940s ski 
holidays were offered by hoteliers in the 
Cairngorms area. By the 1950s ski areas were 
established at Glencoe, Glenshee the Lecht and 
Cairngorm, with the first private ski school 
founded in 1954. Commercial skiing in the 
Highlands began in 1956 when the White 
Corries Ski Company opened the first 
commercial ski lift at Glencoe. Five years 
later in 1961 the Cairngorm Ski Centre began 
its first commercial operations. Glenshee 
opened soon after in 1962 with the Lecht Ski 
Centre opening in 1978. Nevis Range Ski 
Centre which opened in 1989 is the most 
recent commercial ski development in 
Scotland. 
Tourism is a significant industry in Scotland, 
particularly in the H.I.E. constituency and is 
actively promoted by, and receives funds from, 
the public sector. The Highlands and Islands 
Single Programming document (European 
Commission, 1994) suggests that tourism 
employs 20% of the workforce and is 
responsible for 20% of the Gross Domestic 
Product in the H.I.E region. Chief among the 
reasons for promoting skiing as a tool for 
economic regeneration in the Highlands, is the 
problem of seasonality. Seasonality or the 
trend towards higher levels of unemployment 
in the winter months is a feature of 
employment patterns throughout the UK but is 
particularly pronounced in the H.I.E. area. 
The extension of the tourist season is a stated 
objective of both the Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise Agency and the Scottish Tourist 
Board. These bodies have encouraged the 
development of skiing in the H.I.E. 
constituency as one means of generating 
employment in the winter months (January to 
March) when only 11% of all tourist trips are 
taken in the constituency as compared to the 
summer months (July to September) which 
accounted for 43% of trips to the constituency 
between 1991 and 1993 (Scottish Tourist 
Board, 1993). 
The Scottish skiing industry however, is itself 
not immune to the vagaries of the Scottish 
weather with the volume of skiing activity 
varying dramatically depending upon the 
prevailing weather conditions. Figure 1, 
shows the total number of skier days each year 
in Scotland between 1981 and 1995. Good 
seasons show figures up at 680,000, poor as 
litde as 190,000. With break-even at around 
half a million skier days, a series of bad 
winters makes investment extremely risky. 
In addition to this risk, the level of public 
investment in the infrastructure of skiing in 
Scotland is contentious especially amongst 
those who object to certain ski related 
developments on environmental grounds. The 
environmental impacts of ski developments 
include disturbance to wildlife and their 
habitats which may be exacerbated in the 
summer months by the easier access to fragile 
alpine environments which the access roads 
and summer opening of chairlifts afford. Ski 
developments may also affect site hydrology 
encouraging erosion. The presence of 
permanent mechanised structures in otherwise 
'wild' areas may spoil the 'wildness 
experience' sought by other mountain 
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recreationalists and may impair the scenic 
qualities of the area (Save the Cairngorms 
Campaign, 1992). Moreover, pollution may 
be caused by the construction debris, litter, 
chemicals and sewage associated with ski 
developments (Scottish Tourist Board, 1986). 
Environmental concerns are often concentrated 
upon the visual intrusion of ski centres and die 
issues of summer access to areas which in the 
absence of ski centres would be relatively 
inaccessible. Environmental studies by Wood 
(1987) and Watson (1991) conclude that 
numbers of summer visitors are increasing in 
the Cairngorm area, where the skiing 
development versus environmental protection 
debate is particularly polarised. 
The environmental significance of the 
mountain environment in the Scottish 
Highlands, albeit more of a scientific than 
popular nature, is recognised in environmental 
legislation. Glencoe is exceptional in that it 
does not impinge upon an environmentally 
sensitive site; of the remaining sites, 
Cairngorm, Glenshee and Nevis Range all lie 
within, or border National Scenic Areas. The 
Lecht lies wholly within a site of Special 
Scientific Interest, wim parts of Cairngorm and 
Nevis Range ski centres also abutting sites of 
special scientific interest (Ross, 1993). Parts 
of Glenshee and Cairngorm are areas of 
Special Protection For Birds under Section 3 
Of The Wildlife And Countryside Act, 1981. 
This designation means that planning 
permission may be challenged before the 
European Commission under its directive 
79/409/EEC on me conservation of wild birds. 
If successfully challenged by the European 
Commission, the development in question 
would have to be removed and the developer 
compensated (Raemakers, 1991). A decision 
on whether to designate the Cairngorm Massif 
area a World Heritage Site, as called for in 
1983, is still pending. A proposal to extend 
skiing at Cairngorm into Lurchers Gully in 
1981 led to a public enquiry which rejected the 
proposals on environmental grounds, leading 
to the publication of a National Planning 
Guideline for skiing in 1994. A second 
proposal for the development of ski facilities at 
Lurchers Gully in 1989 was also rejected on 
environmental grounds, prompting the 
foundation of the Cairngorms Working Party 
and subsequentiy the Cairngorms Partnership. 
More recently the views of environmentalists 
and the pro-skiing lobby have again clashed 
over the proposed funicular railway scheme at 
Cairngorm and the £9m the proposed scheme 
will attract in public subsidy (R.S.P.B 1998). 
The funicular would replace the existing 
chairlift which gave the Cairngorm Chairlift 
Company its name and is now over 30 years 
old. It is contended that the funicular which 
would carry 1000 - 2000 skiers per hour in 
winter could create 100,000 extra skier days. 
Seats would be fitted in summer, reducing die 
uplift capacity to 500 - 600 visitors per hour, 
supporting 250,000 summer visitors (The 
Scotsman, 1993). Supporters of the funicular 
scheme included the H.I.E which was prepared 
to give financial backing to the scheme, the 
Cairngorms Chairlift Company itself, other 
businesses in the Aviemore area, downhill 
skiers and their associations and the majority 
of the local population. The Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds (R.S.P.B) and the 
National Trust for Scotland opposed the 
funicular scheme arguing that it would bring 
visitors close to their Abemethy and Mar 
Lodge Estates respectively, undennining meir 
efforts at environmental protection and 
management. The World Wide Fund for 
Nature, the Ramblers Association and the Save 
the Cairngorms Campaign also opposed the 
funicular scheme. The most important 
objector however, was Scottish Natural 
Heritage (S.N.H). S.N.H believed that it had a 
statutory obligation to object to the Cairngorm 
funicular plan due to European Union 
environmental legislation pertaining to the 
protection of birds on the fragile Cairngorm 
plateau. Highland Regional Council witiiheld 
planning permission while the Cairngorm 
Chairlift Company negotiated a visitor 
management plan with S.N.H. A visitor 
management plan involving guided walks by 
rangers was rejected by S.N.H as unworkable. 
An alternative Glenmore gondola plan, put 
forward in March 1996 and supported by 
environmental groups including the R.S.P.B 
and Scottish Wildlife and Countryside link, 
was rejected by Highland Regional Council. 
Negotiations by S.N.H and the Cairngorm 
Chairlift Company led to agreement on a 
revised visitor management plan. The new 
plan comprises a 'closed system' whereby 
summer visitors will have no access to the 
Cairngorm plateau, but will instead receive an 
audio-visual presentation outlying the 
environmental importance of the area, upon 
reaching me top station. The successful 
negotiations meant S.N.H withdrew its 
objection and planning permission for the 
funicular was granted. The World Wide Fund 
for Nature and die R.S.P.B continue to object 
to the Cairngorm Funicular and the revised 
visitor management plan on environmental 
grounds. The two bodies took the Cairngorm 
funicular plans to a judicial review in 
November 1997, the review will be continued 
in April 1998. It is not yet clear whemer 
European Union objective 1 subsidy, 
necessary for the financial viability of the 
funicular project, will be made available. 
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There is now some debate as to whether the 
funicular scheme with a restrictive 
management plan in place is sustainable in 
commercial terms. In 1996, the Chairman of 
the H.I.E gave his support to the funicular plan 
which he claimed would underpin 2500 tourist 
jobs whilst creating 100 jobs directly (Buie, 
1996). It was claimed that the modernisation 
of the ski site was necessary if the Cairngorm 
Chairlift Company with an annual turnover of 
around £3 million, feeding an estimated £15 
million into Strathspey's economy was to 
flourish (Freeman, 1994). The estimated 
250,000 summer ticket sales necessary to 
make the funicular economically viable is 
argued to be unrealistic (Cairns, 1996) given 
competing attractions in the area. A study by 
Westbrook (1994) suggested that the 100 jobs 
the scheme would create would cost £89,286 
each, compared with the average cost of 
creating a tourism related job in the region of 
£10,000. Westbrook suggests that public 
funds may be better directed at smaller tourist 
related schemes which are less 
environmentally contentious (Clouston, 1994). 
A number of factors make the determination of 
the exact volume of public subsidy directed 
towards skiing developments over the years 
difficult to obtain. There are a number of 
public agencies which may direct subsidy 
towards tourism developments including 
skiing, namely; Local Authorities, the Scottish 
Tourist Board, Area Based Tourist Boards, the 
S.N.H, the Scottish Sports Council, the H.I.E 
and its Local Enterprise Companies. Some of 
these bodies, such as S.N.H the H.I.E and the 
newly restructured Local Authorities have 
been established relatively recently and 
changes in accounting practices between 
current administrations and their predecessor 
bodies may make grants and loans to skiing 
developments problematic to track historically. 
Public agencies which have an obligation to 
protect the commercial confidentiality of their 
ski company clients will often not make 
explicit the amount of subsidy they have given 
to skiing in their annual reports. Moreover, 
where a grant or loan is specifically cited, such 
as in, for example, the Annual Report of S.N.H 
(1993) which gave £3,600 towards lavatory 
facilities at Glencoe Ski Centre, there remains 
the potential problem of double counting as 
the H.I.E or similar public body may well have 
given grant assistance to S.N.H. Similarly 
many tourist developments are jointly funded 
by a combination of public agencies cited 
above. Moreover, the majority of the key 
public expenditures which took place at 
Cairngorm, Glencoe, Glenshee and the Lecht 
would have occurred in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s when these sites were first 
established. Thus, such expenditures if they 
could be identified would require to be inflated 
to 1990's prices to make meaningful 
comparisons possible. 
Further problems may arise when attempting 
to define public subsidy. Herein, public 
subsidy is taken to be monies distributed by 
various government agencies. However, even 
here there may be ambiguity, the Scottish 
Sports Council is funded partially by 
charitable donations and partly by government 
grant Moreover, it is debatable whether 
grants from the National Lottery (which 
awarded the Lecht ski centre £990,200 in 1996 
for the purchase of snow making machinery) 
should be viewed as public money per se, as 
this was revenue not raised from taxation. 
Furthermore, European Union money may be 
distributed via the government agencies 
previously outlined, or as in the case of 
Objective One funding, may be distributed by 
an independent board with more indirect links 
with government agencies. 80% of the recent 
£750,000 extension of faculties at Nevis 
Range was financed by European Union 
Objective One subsidy. Moreover, subsidy 
may occur in an indirect manner, as in the case 
of local authorities, which routinely clear snow 
from the car parks and access roads of the 
Scottish ski centres. 
Despite the aforementioned difficulties, it is 
theoretically possible to make some inferences 
about the public expenditures directed towards 
skiing in more recent years from the Company 
Accounts of the various ski centres. The 
identification of public subsidy in the company 
accounts is itself however fraught with 
difficulty. The majority of company accounts 
cite assets net of grant Putting grants directly 
against revenue in this way is reasonable, since 
much of the infrastructure at ski sites such as 
pylons for tows is not transferable. The 
difference between costs of developments and 
extensions to facilities at these sites and the net 
revenue cited in the accounts may be 
presumed to be government subsidy. 
Glenshee however, uses a different accounting 
convention with grants shown as income in the 
accounts and set against depreciation of assets. 
Differences in accounting conventions make 
comparisons of subsidy between sites difficult. 
Even if an estimate of subsidy is identified in 
the company accounts it is of course 
impossible to identify from which government 
agency the subsidy was raised. 
In 1995 the Glenshee Chairlift Company 
bought out White Corries Limited, the 
operators of the Glencoe Ski Centre for 
£223,000. Glenshee also upgraded its 
cafeteria facilities at a cost of around £750,000 
for which they received £143,000 in grant 
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assistance (Glenshee Chairlift Company, 
1996). Cairngorm in the 1992-1996 period 
received a long term loan for approximately 
£800,000 (Cairngorm Chairlift Company, 
1996) and could receive a great deal more 
public investment via the European Union 
Objective One funding if the Cairngorm 
Funicular scheme goes ahead. Nevis Range, 
since its establishment in 1989 has received 
£4.2 million in grant and loan assistance 
(Nevis Range PLC, 1997). The accounts of 
the Nevis Range Ski Company (which as the 
most recently established ski centre is the 
easiest to investigate for public subsidy) 
suggests that 60 to 70% of capital spending by 
ski companies in Scotland is financed by 
public investment. 
3. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
SCOTTISH SKI CENTRES TO 
THE H.IJE. ECONOMY 
Given the recent press surrounding the 
proposed Cairngorm Funicular railway and the 
apparent substantial public sector subsidy of 
capital spending by the five Scottish ski 
centres, an examination of the additionality of 
such public spending would seem to be both 
pertinent and topical. During the 1995/1996 
ski season a sample of 1010 skiers was drawn 
in face to face interviews at each of the five ski 
sites. Interviews were conducted over one day 
at the weekend and one quieter weekday at 
each site in order to obtain data on skiers 
expenditures which was as representative as 
possible. Respondents in our sample were 
estimated to have spent a total of £17,665,224 
in the H.I.E constituency, after extrapolation to 
the population. This compares with an H.I.E 
estimate that around £20 million per annum is 
spent on skiing in the constituency, supporting 
directly and indirectly 1500 jobs in the winter 
months (Highlands and Islands Enterprise, 
1991). 
In assessing the impact of a given activity on a 
regional economy it is usual to assume that all 
visitor spending is additional and moreover, 
that the activity related expenditure of 
residents is simply a transfer within the region 
(McGilvary and Pennan, 1991). If for 
example, H.I.E was the relevant constituency, 
the expenditures of H.I.E residents on skiing 
might be viewed as merely an internal transfer 
of funds and excluded from the analysis. The 
loss to the H.I.E area from the closure of all 
five sites would thus be £14,208,740, which is 
the estimated total expenditure of skiers 
resident outwith the H.I.E area. Employing 
these assumptions, the loss to Scotland of the 
closure of all five Scottish ski centres would, 
according to our data, be £6,435,510, which is 
the estimated total expenditure of skiers 
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resident outwith Scotland. This relatively low 
figure given total skiing expenditure is a 
reflection of the fact that skiers in Scotland are 
predominantly Scottish. Although, it is 
estimated that over a million British adults are 
skiers (Projection 2000, 1989) few British 
skiers will take a skiing trip in Scotland. 
Indeed, 50% of British skiers do not take a 
skiing holiday annually and many skiers will 
only ski abroad (Keynote Report, 1991). Our 
data on trip frequency gathered in the field 
survey suggested that there were around 
200,000 skiers making trips in Scotland in the 
1995/1996 season. 
The total closure of all five ski sites is an 
unlikely prospect. A counterfactual scenario 
was posed in order to derive the additionality 
of individual ski sites to the H.I.E region, 
incorporating the effects of expenditure 
switching between substitute skiing sites and 
non-skiing activities. The scenario asked all 
visiting skiers what they would have done in 
the theoretical instance that the ski site at 
which they were interviewed had been 
unavailable. In an open question, all visitors 
in the sample chose one of four alternatives. 
They believed they would have either: stayed 
at home; skied elsewhere; took part in some 
alternative winter outdoor recreation; or 
enjoyed other attractions in the local area. The 
appropriate multiplicand (i.e. exogenous 
injection) is the differential between visitors' 
actual spending and the amount they believe 
they would have spent locally on an alternative 
ski site or activity. The remaining portion of 
the skiers' expenditure is, in effect, transferred 
internally and should be disregarded. Take for 
example a group of visiting skiers interviewed 
at Cairngorm. If this group spent £100and 
believe they would have spent £20 less if they 
had (say) skied elsewhere, then it is this 
differential expenditure of £20 which ought to 
count as the multiplicand net of transfer. 
Conceivably, if visiting skiers would have 
spent more in the local area the site 
multiplicand could be negative. The 
multiplicands of skiers net of transfer effects, 
were extrapolated to the site population by 
multiplying average expenditure per person 
per day for each group by an appropriate 
percentage proportion of the skier days 
figures for that site (Mackay, 1995). Both the 
gross expenditure of visiting skiers and their 
expenditures net of transfers are given in Table 
1. 
Clearly visiting skiers have good substitution 
possibilities in the form of other ski sites or 
other attractions of the H.I.E area and would 
for the most part continue to spend in the 
region if their first choice site was not 
available. 
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With respect to skiers resident in H.I.E., the 
usual assumption is that their expenditure is 
simply a transfer. The counterfactual scenario 
was also presented to resident skiers to 
question this assumption. The results are 
given in Table 2. 
The negative multiplicands observed for H.I.E 
residents at Cairngorm and Nevis Range in 
Table 2 above, reflect the fact that on 
aggregate these groups would spend more on 
their chosen alternative activity. In reality, 
their overall consumption spending in the 
region may be unchanged with the increased 
spending on skiing being afforded by a 
reduction in other consumption spending 
within the region. On the other hand, it is 
possible that some skiers may reduce savings 
or increase borrowing to finance their 
additional spending on skiing. If this effect 
was strong the negative sign is legitimate with 
the magnitude of the resident multiplicand for, 
say, Cairngorm lying between £0 and 
-£165,393. 
In Table 3 below, the net expenditures in 
Tables 1 and 2, are combined producing a 
range for the multiplicand for each site. 
It would be wrong to suggest from these 
results that the H.I.E. constituency would not 
suffer economically if one of the five Scottish 
ski sites were to close. Over 40% of the 
respondents in the sample cited closeness to 
other ski centres as a positive influence on 
their destination choice, this suggests a degree 
of synergy between sites which may be lost if 
one were to close. 
The permanent closure of one or all ski sites is 
however, an unlikely prospect and policy 
makers may be more concerned with the 
marginal economic impact of improvements to 
facilities. The counterfactual scenario 
revealed that skiers exhibited a high cross 
elasticity of demand with 73.5% of all 
respondents in the sample indicating that they 
would have skied elsewhere if the site they 
were at was closed. This suggests, far from 
the hoped for effect of encouraging new skiers 
to Scotland, any improvement in faculties at 
one site is likely to be met with a redistribution 
of skiers from other existing sites, subject to a 
capacity constraint. Furthermore, it is possible 
that this redistribution would also occur, in the 
separate summer visitor market, resulting 
perhaps in a decrease in the market share of 
summer visitors at Nevis Range, if the 
Cairngorm funicular plan were to proceed. 
The counterfactual scenario made it possible to 
measure the contribution of each individual 
site net of transfer to the H.I.E. economy. An 
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change in the Scottish skiing industry, taken as 
a system, net of transfer, would require further 
econometric analysis and additional data. The 
responses from the counterfactual scenario do 
allow some revision of the total economic loss 
to the H.I.E of the total closure of all five sites, 
previously calculated to be £14,208,740. If 
skiing was unavailable at all five sites, those 
who would have stayed at home or skied 
elsewhere would not have visited the H.I.E 
constituency, as skiing appears to have been 
the main purpose of their visit. On the other 
hand, those who state that they would have 
partaken in another mountain recreation or 
something else in the H.I.E constituency may 
have been planning a visit to the area 
regardless of the availability of skiing. Taking 
this approach, the economic loss to the H.I.E 
constituency, if all five sites were to close is 
£12,756,270. These estimates are based on the 
1995 \ 1996 ski season which was a relatively 
good year in terms of weather conditions with 
504,000 visitors (Mackay, 1995). According 
to our estimates therefore, a poor winter may 
be expected to result in the loss of 50% of 
skier days (see figure 1) and around £6m to the 
H.I.E economy. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Given the degree of substitutability between 
sites, it might be difficult to justify further 
public subsidy of improvements to commercial 
ski developments on the basis of additional 
income and employment. On the other hand, 
skiing does make a substantial overall 
contribution to the H.I.E. economy and the 
case can be made that continued public 
investment is necessary to maintain existing 
incomes and employment, particularly in the 
winter months. Infrastructural upgrading has 
had the benefit of improving the quality of 
skiing in Scotland. Figure 2 shows the real 
price of skiing at Cairngorm from 1970. 
Rather surprisingly, it appears that, in common 
with the other centres, little of the quality 
improvement has been reflected in increases in 
real prices. With overall demand static, in 
effect, the investment in Scotland can best be 
viewed as an attempt to maintain market share 
through quality improvement in the light of 
increasing competition from Europe and North 
America. 
There has been a tendency in the public debate 
surrounding the funicular development to 
concentrate on additional employment and 
output, comparing these benefits with the 
potential loss in welfare of conservationists, 
ornithologists and others who value the 
Cairngorm as an important natural asset. This 
debate has proceeded somewhat to the 
52 
Quarterly Economic Commentary 
exclusion of the issue of maintaining existing 
winter employment and income as well as the 
potential welfare gains of skiers. Has an 
implicit interpersonal judgement been made 
that the welfare of, say, ornithologists should 
have a greater weight than that of skiers? 
Unlike the funding of manufacturing 
developments, investment in recreational 
activity carries a double dividend in that it 
bom maintains employment and improves the 
quality of life. Perhaps a full Cost Benefit 
Analysis of skiing in Scotland could lead to a 
more infonned debate in which the issues of 
environmental costs and consumer satisfaction 
would be more fully examined. 
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Table 1 
Expenditures Attributable To Skiing 
Glencoe 
Glensb.ee 
Cairngorm 
Nevis Range 
The Lecht 
Total 
Gross Expenditure of 
Visiting Skiers 
£ 799,390 
£ 4,065,487 
£ 5,791,666 
£2,322,108 
£ 1,230,089 
£14,208,740 
Net Expenditure of 
Visiting Skiers 
£11,680 
£696,868 
£549,184 
£205,519 
£ 73,567 
Table 2 
Net Expenditure Of Resident Skiers 
Glencoe 
Glenshee 
Cairngorm 
Nevis Range 
The Lecht 
£ 18,699 
£ 10,697 
-£165,393 
-£ 37,109 
£ 18,987 
Table 3 
Site Multiplicands Net of Transfer 
Glencoe 
Glenshee 
Cairngorm 
Nevis Range 
The Lecht 
£11,680 -£30,379 
£696,868 - £707,565 
£549,184-£383,791 
£205,519-£168,410 
£73,567 -£92,554 
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Figure 1 (Compiled from data from Mackay Consultants) 
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Figure 2 Real Price of Skiing at Cairngorm 
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